Information has always had geography. It is from somewhere; about somewhere; it evolves and is transformed somewhere; it is mediated by networks, infrastructures, and technologies: all of which exist in physical, material places. These geographies of information about places matter because they shape how we are able to find and understand different parts of the world. Places invisible or discounted in representations are invisible in practice to many people. In other words, geographic augmentations are much more than just representations of places: they are part of the place itself; they shape it rather than simply reflect it. This fusing of the spatial and informational augmentations that are immutable means that annotations of place emerge as sites of political contestation: with different groups of people trying to impose different narratives on informational augmentations. This paper therefore explores how information geographies have their own geographic distributions: geographies of access, of participation, and of representation. The paper offers a deliberately broad survey of a range of key platforms that mediate, host, and deliver different types of geographic information. It does so using a combination of existing statistics and bespoke data not previously mapped or analysed. Through this effort, the paper demonstrates that in addition to the geographies of uneven access to contemporary modes of communication, uneven geographies of participation and representation are also evident and in some cases are being amplified rather than alleviated. In other words, the paper comprehensively shows one important facet of contemporary information geographies: that geographic information itself is characterised by a host of uneven geographies. The paper concludes that there are few signs that global informational peripheries are achieving comparable levels of participation or representation with traditional information cores, despite the hopes that the fast-paced spread of the internet to three billion people might change this pattern.
It is precisely this mobility and adaptability of information that provides the motivation to constrain the mutability of information through the creation of what Latour (1986) refers to as 'immutable mobiles': or information that can be transported without significant change to its inherent characteristics or meaning. The printing press, for instance, made it relatively cheap to create and transport information in the container of printed paper while simultaneously limiting how its form could change. As ICT-based non-proximate communication emerged and was adopted by governments and companies, the ability to create 'immutable mobiles' or shared understandings of information by non-proximate and asynchronous populations became vital. Information and power thus became intimately intertwined as people capitalised on the value associated with epistemic control: information represented 'this' and not 'that' (Schech 2002; Foucault 2000) .
A key characteristic of immutable mobiles is their ability to crystallise informational layers of places in a moveable container; to create particular 'geographies of information ' (Wilson 2015) . A map, a tourist guide, or a postcard all annotate a bounded part of the world tied to a relatively immutable form that can be physically moved around the world. Thus, immutable mobiles impact representations of places that are used both in the locales referenced and in other parts of the world (Dodge and Kitchin 2007; Kitchin et al. 2011) . Information about any location can be abstracted from it and placed in the relatively immutable form of printed paper: thus simultaneously fixing information to a physical object and untethering it to a locale, as this form can be easily moved through space. In the era of print, the geography of immutable mobiles such as maps or books largely defined the geography of codified and geographically referenced information.
ICTs have also facilitated an evolution of information beyond immutable mobiles through the creation of '(im)mutable augmentations' characterised by the layering of dynamic information across and over geographic space. Thus, not only does information have particular geographies, but geography itself is layered, defined, and augmented by information that is more or less immutable [i.e. both mutable and immutable: or (im)mutable] depending upon the institutions and practices associated with it (Perkins 2014) . The Sydney Opera House, for instance, is not just a building made from bricks and mortar. Nor is it simply represented by guidebook entries, postcards and other immutable mobiles that are trapped within their containers. It is also overlaid with digital images, videos, descriptions, reviews about tours and past performances, as well as innumerable stories told about experiences associated with it that are stored in online maps, annotations and websites. All of those things are informational, but are also part of the place itself; they are part of how we enact and bring the place into being 1 Graham 2013; Floridi 2011) . The advent of the (im) mutable augmentations and mobile tools that allow us to access this information while in situ (for shopping, wayfinding, driving, sightseeing, protesting, and many other geographic activities) places an ever greater value in the epistemic control to fix informational layers of place . These (im)mutable augmentations of information about places matter because they shape how we are able to find and understand different parts of the world (Shelton et al. 2014) . Places invisible or discounted in representations are equally invisible in practice to many people. A restaurant omitted from a map can cease to be a restaurant if nobody finds it. Likewise, how places are presented within informational augmentations fundamentally affects how they are used or brought into being . In other words, geographic augmentations are much more than just representations of places: they are part of the place itself; they shape it rather than simply reflect it; and the map again becomes part of the territory (Pickles 2004; Floridi 2014) . This fusing of the spatial and informational augmentations that are immutable can result in high stakes as annotations of place emerge as sites of political contestation: with different groups of people trying to impose different narratives on informational augmentations (Zook and Graham 2007) .
In short: the 'geography of information' -the geographic distribution of information either as a phenomenon in its own right or as representative of some other underlying process (Wilson 2015) -has long been a key means of control and power formation. The rise of 'information geographies' -informational augmentations to places -represents a key and emerging area of inquiry for scholars of information and this article seeks to provide an initial starting point for this research. After a brief review of pre-digital geographies of information, this paper explores how information geographies have their own geographic distributions: geographies of access, of participation, and of representation.
Pre-digital geographies of information
In the pre-digital age, the affordances of technologies and associated socio-technical systems for collecting, storing and disseminating information meant that information was both scarce and geographically embedded. For instance, at the dawn of the nineteenth century the tools for collating encyclopaedic information about places (e.g. compasses, paper, sextants) were concentrated in only a few hands and places; making the ability to engage in large-scale data collection relatively rare. Even more so, because the required propinquity to the ISSN 2054-4049 Citation: 2015, 2, 88-105 doi: 10.1002/geo2.8object of measurement inherent in collecting information about places, entailed a scale of organisation not widely available. Likewise, the state of the art for containing information -the book -required specific points of access to codified content for its production. Books were also constrained by a particular formtwo-dimensional printed material of pre-specified dimensions, usually part of a linear reading trajectory from start to finish -and method of physical storage in particular places.
Other key bottlenecks in the processing of information included the availability of requisite skillsets to manage, validate, merge, modify, classify, sort, analyse and manipulate information into particular forms and formats. The institutions that emerged to meet this challenge -universities, associations, and guildsrequired resources (which, in turn, often needed to be 'spatially fixed') and, as a result, formalised education in information handling practices were necessarily place bound and concentrated in specific locales. These geographic centres of calculation meant that the ability to access codified information, let alone contribute to it (i.e. the professionalisation of knowledge work) was also highly constrained.
Although the affordances of pre-digital technologies (and their associated systems of governance, economisation, and socialisation) allowed for movements of codified information (shifted from its point of creation to other locations), it could never transcend the innate materiality of its medium or the world. In short, the frictions of mobility associated with transmitting and storing information, the placebound rules and forms of governance, and the availability of requisite technologies that have all shaped the geographies of information in this era. In practice, these constraints manifest into hegemonic representations and hegemonic modes of participation (cf Gramsci 1971) and because knowledge and codified information are always produced under conditions of power (Crampton 2008; Pickles 1994) , control over hegemonic representations has been a way of exerting economic, social, and political power (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) .
Books, newspapers, and patents, for instance, were all far more likely to be published from (and about) the global North: with the global South playing a relatively minor role in producing, using, and controlling codified information (Zhang et al. 2013; Graham et al. 2011; Thompson and Fox-Kean 2005) .
2 This information power and power over information manifests into distinct spatial patterns and almost all traditional mediums of information are characterised by significant spatial inequalities leading Castells (1999, 3) to conclude that 'most of Africa is being left in a technological apartheid'. Castells (2010) goes on to characterise the systemic and uneven relationship between information production/use and socio-economic exclusion and marginalisation as the 'black holes of informational capitalism'.
Changing geographies after the information revolution?
Against this backdrop, the past decades have seen a sea change in the availability of information. The terms 'information revolution' (Floridi 2014) and 'data revolution' (Kitchin 2014) signify the radical changes in the ways that information is produced and used: implying that we are now in an age of post-information scarcity. This transformation has been brought about by the proliferation of new socio-technical systems of the socalled information age. These systems are underpinned by greater accessibility to computers that can readily receive and transmit information non-proximately via those machines, as well as a host of associated social, economic, and political practices. As a result, many of the barriers to the production, processing, and proliferation of information in the pre-digital era have been drastically lowered. Some have argued that this emerging digital age offers a potentially radically different political economy of information (Benkler 2007; Bruns 2008; Jenkins 2006) . Tapscott and Williams (2006) and Shirky (2011) highlight the ways that digitally mediated participation and representation is broad based, circumventing traditional mediators of information, and allowing citizens to play a more significant role in shaping the content and augmentations that play key roles in their lives (see also Sui and Goodchild 2011) . Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig, a key scholar of the effects of information systems on property rights, has also made some particularly hopeful observations on the democratic power of the internet. At the World Summit on the Information Society, he pointed to the significant possibilities afforded by the Web: '[f]or the first time in a millennium, we have a technology to equalize the opportunity that people have to access and participate in the construction of knowledge and culture, regardless of their geographic placing' (Lessig 2003 ). Lessig's characterisation is not unique; such sentiments also infuse the world of policy and business. In 2012 the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union claimed that once internet connectivity arrives, 'all the world's citizens will have the potential to access unlimited knowledge, to express themselves freely, and to contribute to and enjoy the benefits of the knowledge society' (Touré 2012). Echoing a similar line of rhetoric, Wikipedia seeks to 'contain the sum of all human knowledge'; and Google's stated core mission is to 'organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful' (Google 2015).
These are powerful statements, and permeate all levels of discourse about ICTs and development. While we are disposed to be suspicious of such totalising claims, to date, the existing work on global geographies of information (see Zook 2001; Malecki 2002; Devriendt et al. 2011 ) has tended to use single indicators rather than a comparison of a range of variables to more completely capture the totality associated with the changing political-economy of information. To be sure, the macro-picture is one of extreme connectivity -currently there are 3 billion people and 25 billion devices attached to the global network -but how has this altered the political economy or geographies of information? Has the proliferation of access altered participation or representation? Are changing sociotechnical systems, identified by scholars, policy-makers and corporations, changing information geographies? In other words, because people can, in theory, create and access information about and from almost anywhere on earth, are we seeing different geographies of participation and representation, or new layers of digital augmentations (i.e. data shadows ; Graham 2010 ) that are associated with places?
To answer these questions we engage in a broad-scale survey of the contemporary geographies of key digital and internet-mediated processes and platforms. We divide our work into three categories:
• geographies of access and enablement (i.e. an exploration of who has access to the technologies and services essential for digital communication, participation, and representation); • geographies of participation (i.e. where digital information is generated); and • geographies of representation (i.e. for which parts of the world is content created and not created).
Within each of those categories we produce a series of mappings based on the most definitive sources available. Some data come from established informants (such as the International Telecommunications Union) that provide relevant indicators of information use (as a result, these data have been fairly widely disseminated). In contrast, much of the data used in this paper were generated using bespoke data collection tools and are tightly focused on the geography of one particular manifestation of information (and therefore rarely, if ever, used previously). Rather than describing each dataset in a single methods section, discussions of data types, sources, and limitations are presented in the paper as relevant. For this article we limit ourselves to the scale of the country, an admittedly problematic construct given the diversity of country sizes, numerous border and definitional issues and, perhaps most significantly, the obscuring of the fundamental urban nature of information generation. However, due to the variety of datasets we have drawn upon, many of which only have national level metrics, we have prioritised the standardisation of comparability between maps and leave the key questions on the multi-scalar dimension of information for future research.
Given the diverse range of data sources, this analysis raises far more questions than it answers, but this is our intent. A broad survey of geographies of digital participation and representation provides a baseline from which we hope much further work can build. To fully explore the implications of many local-scale geographic patterns identified here requires in-depth qualitative or statistical analysis in order to contextualise the patterns in the political economy, governance and social practices in terms of both the online platforms used and the places they augment. However, we maintain that bringing together such a diverse range of sources adds an aggregated value not possible with a focus solely on a single data source.
Geographies of access and enablement
Understanding geographies of access and enablement provides important insights into the distribution of technologies and services that are essential for digital communication, participation, and representation. Specifically, internet access is a prerequisite for most types of digital engagement, and thus it is key to illustrate global patterns of (dis)connectivity. Figure 1 uses 2011 data 3 on internet users and total population datasets from the World Bank, which has tracked internet users and internet connections per country since the 1990s. In the remainder of the paper, the terms 'internet population' and 'internet users' refer to the segment of the population of a country that has access to the internet. This is calculated using the internet penetration of a country (according to definitions and data from the World Bank). The data are visualised with a hexagon-shaped cartogram in which the size of each country determined by its population of internet users (with each hexagon representing a third of a million internet users). Countries with fewer than 333 333 users are not on the map. The shading of each country reflects its internet penetration rate: darker shades indicate higher levels of per capita internet usage in the population. The distortion in the cartogram highlights the country level concentrations of users, with China possessing the world's largest internet population at over half a billion and the United States, India and Japan following as the next most populous nations of internet users.
This listing also highlights two important trends. First, the emergence of Asia as the largest component of the world's internet population with 42% of the world's internet users, which in other terms means that ISSN 2054-4049 Citation: 2015, 2, 88-105 doi: 10.1002/geo2.8the combination of China, India and Japan has more internet users than Europe and North America combined. Second, few countries with large numbers of users fall into the top quintile (80+%) of internet penetration and some, such as India, are in the lowest category with less than 20% of its population on the internet. In other words, in many of the world's largest internet nations, there is still substantial room for growth.
Another key geographic pattern of internet penetration is that all but four of the countries (Canada, New Zealand, Qatar and South Korea) with penetration rates greater than 80% are in Europe. In contrast, Latin America, which as a whole now hosts almost as many internet users as the Unites States, has 40-60% penetration rates. The case of Africa is the most varied, with some countries experiencing high growth, whereas other have seen little change. Almost all North African countries doubled their population of internet users (Algeria is a notable exception) in the last three years, and Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa also saw massive growth. However, over 20 sub-Saharan African countries have an internet penetration of less than 10% with little growth in recent years. It is thus key to remember that despite the massive role of the internet in everyday life in Western Europe -where this paper was written and published -most people on our planet remain without access.
Broadband affordability
In addition to unevenness in the geography of internet access, the relative cost of access varies greatly across places. . Figure 2 highlights one of the core themes of the global digital divide: the relative cost of being connected to the internet. Europe and North America have high absolute costs, ranging between about US$10 and 40 a month, but have some of the lowest relative costs in the world: a couple of hours of work a month is sufficient for an average worker to afford the cost of connectivity. This, in part, helps to explain some of the patterns shown in Figure 1 : such as the fact that the cost of a broadband connection in most parts of Africa is prohibitive for most people since in much of the continent the cost ranges between 10% and 250% of average income. In contrast, North and South American and European users can obtain broadband connections for less than (and often much less than) 10% of their incomes, a distinction shared by only five sub-Saharan African countries.
The issue is more the low average incomes of Africans rather than high broadband costs. Indeed, thanks to a series of cables laid around the African continent in 2009, the average cost of an African internet connection is now half of what it was 4 years ago. Kenya and Nigeria, for instance, have 2011 broadband costs that are 21% and 8% of 2008 levels (ITU 2013): figures that have undoubtedly contributed to the significant growth in the number of internet users in both countries. Of course, it is not simply a market mechanism at work as the regulatory regimes under which broadband is made available also shape the conditions under which users gain access.
Costs, however, remain a key barrier in many places, such as Eritrea, where a yearly subscription costs the The data presented in Figures 1 and 2 are some of the most important in understanding current information geographies. Without the ability and means to connect, any chance to participate in or contribute to representations of their localities is simply impossible. Yet, despite these uneven geographies, it is important to remember that there are now almost 3 billion internet users who do have some form of access. With this in mind, this paper explores the relative propensity of those users to both create and share content, and represent and annotate our world. what types of domains are incorporated (or not) into marketing or the awareness and interest in contributing to Github or Wikipedia, they also represent global communities of practice that transcend the particularise of any one place. By analysing and comparing three important (yet different) indicators of content creation on the web, we are able to highlight possible common patterns in participation while also highlighting the ways that difference in platform and purpose shape users' involvement.
Geographies of participation

The geography of domain names
Domains are useful providing a proxy for the location of digital content since they are employed as a key 'building block' of the internet (Zook 2001) as they provide a key means by which users navigate. Although data transverse the internet via IP addresses (such as 91.198.174.192 6 ) these numerical addresses are difficult for people to remember, which led to the creation of the domain name system in the 1980s. While other channels exist for distributing content online, e.g. free domains featuring advertising banners or social media platforms, domain names remain in high demand by business, civil society organisations and individuals from around the world seeking to make their material findable. This is amply evidenced by the expansion of several hundred new generic top-level domains by the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 2014. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the two principle types of domain names: generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs) such as .com or .org and country code Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs) associated with specific countries (for instance, .de for Germany and .ke for Kenya). Both types of domain names require formal registration and information gathered during the processes (such as country location) is accessible through a variety of internet utilities such as whois or dig which were utilised to construct this dataset. Building on previous work that shows that the registration location for domains is a good indicator for level of online content production (Zook 2000 2001) we established country level locations for all 144.5 million registered gTLDs after removing large holdings of domains by single entities that are the product of speculative holdings or pay per click advertising. Because ccTLDs are strongly associated with particular countries, Figure 3 assumes that in contrast to gTLDs, ccTLDs (with a number of key exceptions 7 ) are registered and used by people in the country associated with it, i.e. most .fr domains are used in France and most .za domains are used in South Africa. By using both types of domain names we can also account for local differences in domain name registration practices tied to varying registration policies between ccTLDs. For example, Scandinavian registries tend towards more restrictive regimes and in reaction have a relatively higher use of gTLD domains than countries with less restrictive policies such as the United Kingdom or Germany.
The cartogram in Figure 3 depicts any country that is home to more than 10 000 gTLD and ccTLD domains as a red circle. The area of each circle is sized according to the number of domain names registered in that country and the shading of each circle indicates the internet population of a country used in Figure 1 . Therefore, a small, dark circle (like India or .in) indicates that the country is home to a large population of internet users, but a relatively small number of domains. In contrast, a larger, light circle (like Sweden, .se) indicates that a country is home to a relatively small internet population, but many domain names. Figure 3 shows that the majority of domains (78%) are registered in Europe or North America: a finding that highlights the dominance of those two regions in terms of internet content production. Asia, in contrast, is home to only 13% of the world's domains while Latin America (5%), Oceania (3%), and the Middle East and Africa combined (2%) have even smaller shares of the world's websites. This disparity has recently become a policy issue for ICANN, which in March 2015 released a call for proposals to help expand the use of domain names in the Middle East Region (ICANN 2015) .
Globally, there are approximately 10 internet users for every registered domain but this number comes with a bipartite relationship and a significant standard variance. The United States has about one domain name for every three internet users, which is a higher rate than western Europe in general -with five internet users per domain -although this can vary significantly for specific countries, e.g. the Netherlands and Switzerland have as few as two internet users per domain. China 8 , in contrast, boasts the world's largest internet population, but has only one registered domain for every 40 internet users. In fact, there are fewer domains registered in China than in the United Kingdom: with about one-tenth of China's internet population. In most of the Middle East and Africa this ratio is even smaller, with one domain per over 50 internet users. It is important to note that Asian countries tend to have relatively low numbers of registered domains compared with European countries with similar internet populations. Japan is home to twice the number of internet users as the United Kingdom, but hosts less than one-third of the number of British websites. Italy and Vietnam have almost the same internet populations, but Italy is home to more than seven times the number of websites. Uzbekistan has more internet users than Switzerland, but not even 1% of the number of Swiss domains (suggestive of the extensive internet censorship in operation in the country).
A key take-away from this geography of content production is that large internet populations do not automatically translate into large numbers of domain registrations (e.g. India or China). In other words, there appears to be large differences between access to information and participating in its creation and distribution with Western Europe and North America far more likely to be home to producers of digital content than anywhere else in the world.
Distributions of collaborative coding
Of course, domain names are but one possible metric for participation and thus it is important to also review other possible indicators of content production. GitHub is the largest code hosting service in the world, containing 17 million repositories and having 3.5 million registered users (as well as countless more unregistered users). Programmers can use GitHub to publish their code for others to download and use, and to collaboratively work on shared projects, tracking changes and contributions. No other code hosting service has remotely the same number of users, making GitHub a useful proxy for the extent to which internet users create and share code.
Data Figure 4 come from the GitHub archive (GitHub 2015) and include all public events logged by the service. The data contain over 65 million commits made by about 1.1 million users active in 2013. Users are able to specify their home location as a string of text, and 26% of users' entries were geolocatable using the Unlock Places (2015) web service at the University of Edinburgh. Another 2% of entries were given in nongeographic terms (e.g. 'Internet', '127.0.0.1', 'Planet Earth', or 'Everywhere'), with the remaining 72% of profile entries empty. The 26% of locatable users account for over 44% of the commits. While this is a relatively small percentage of all users, we are not aware of any systemic bias that would significantly over-or under-count contributions from particular countries. Figure 4 shows the number of Github users and commits by these users relative to the number of internet users from Figure 1 . While internet penetration explains about one-third of the variability in the number of GitHub users per country, there remain large differences in the rate at which people from different parts of the world contribute. North America and Europe each account for over one-third of the total number of GitHub users and the rate of participation, respectively 34 and 21 GitHub users per 100 000 internet users (hereafter referenced as G per 100 K) contrasts with the global average of 11.4G per 100 K, albeit less dramatically than seen with domain names. The platform is particularly popular in Northern and Eastern Europe, Iceland and Sweden; each have more than 50G per 100 K as well as New Zealand and Australia with about 35G per 100 K.
A majority of the remaining third of GitHub users (17% of the total) are located in Asia, including: Singapore (27G per 100 K) and Taiwan (10G per 100 K), which are the two biggest per capita users. In absolute terms, China is home to 5.6% of Github users but has fewer than 3 Github users per 100 K. The Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa stand out with the lowest levels of participation and combined the regions are home to fewer than 1% of GitHub users and commits and are comparable to the level of activity from Switzerland. In addition to being the home to a majority of users, North America and Europe also contribute at higher rates than the rest of the world. For example, the United States is home to 31% of users but they contribute 35% of commits. The same figures for users/ commits for other standout countries include the Netherlands (1.7/2.4) and Switzerland (0.9/1.4). The opposite pattern is evident in much of the rest of the world, with India accounting for 3.6% of users, but only 1.7% of commits; Brazil for 3.7% of users, and only 2.5% of commits; and South Africa consisting of 0.46% of users, but only 0.36% of all commits.
In sum, just as domain names were disproportionally concentrated within Europe and North America, this more direct measure of content creation and distribution is also skewed. While not as dramatic, it is arguably more profound given the nature of the contributions, not simply websites but software, the lifeblood of the information age. This analysis of Github shows that these regions are significantly more involved in collaborative code development than other parts of the world: with Africa and the Middle East containing considerably fewer people accessing or contributing software than would be expected given the level of internet access.
Geographies of Wikipedia contributions
While code is central to the functioning of contemporary societies, its creation is a particularly specialised endeavour. In contrast, Wikipedia -an open platform that allows all internet users to contribute -offers an indicator of a more generalised level of content creation and contribution. Not only is Wikipedia by far the world's largest and most used encyclopaedia (1600 times larger than the Encyclopaedia Britannica), it is also extremely popular; more than 15% of internet users accessing it on any given day and it is one of the top 20 most accessed websites in 95% of the world's countries . Part of its popularity can be tied to its existence in 282 languages, with 40 of those language versions containing more than 100 000 articles. In other words, edits to Wikipedia have tremendous power to shape content accessed by the majority of internet users around the world.
Wikipedia's approach to contributions, in theory, allows anyone with an internet connection to contribute (the platform's strapline is 'the free encyclopedia that anyone can edit'). However, using the number of edits to every language version of Wikipedia coming from all countries and territory over a 2-year period (2010-2011) 9 , Figure 5 shows that the geography of participation on Wikipedia is highly uneven.
Stark inequalities are readily apparent: over a million edits each quarter come from users located in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. In contrast, only a few thousand edits per quarter are registered from most of Africa and the Middle East. In fact, contributions from Africa are so low that there are actually more edits that originate in Hong Kong than the whole continent combined. While some of these disparities can be explained by the total number of internet users in a country, even normalising by the percent of the population online results in Africa still registering far fewer edits than would be expected (see for detailed statistical analyses on the topic).
A key way that these geographies of participation matter is tied to how content and locales or places is created in different parts of the world. In Figure 6 we have calculated the percentage of local edits to articles that reference places within their own country. In other words, this map illustrates the percentage of edits about a country (i.e. articles that fall within the boundary of a country) that come from users within that country. In this specific instance, we were only able to use data about the English version of Wikipedia because the method of geolocating user profiles involved parsing unstructured English-language text. While many places have a high percentage of content created by local people (for instance 85% and 78% of content about the United States and the United Kingdom comes from users located there), the percentages in Africa are much lower. Only 16% of Nigerian content and 9% of Kenyan content is created by locals and in much of the rest of the continent less than 5% of content is generated locally.
In sum, this section shows the spatial distribution of three modes of participation in contemporary digitally mediated societies. While each data source has its own idiosyncrasies and displays different patterns (to be explored in future research), the general refrain remains consistent: the global North is characterised by the greatest levels of participation and is creating the bulk of digital content, while the global South contributes very little. Africa, in particular, is almost entirely omitted from these processes of digital generativity. Moreover, as Figure 7 shows, these distributions stand in marked contrast to the geographies of internet users. While this is cause for concern in a number of arenas, we now turn to the most direct impact of these differences, namely in the ways in which places are represented (or not) within information geographies. ) and Geonames (the world's largest open gazetteer). In all of these cases, the popularity and openness of these systems provide useful ways to gauge the spatial differences in digital representation.
Geographies of representation
Google searches
Google is the world's most used search engine and thus the geographic content that it either contains or omits can have significant impacts on the representation of places. One way of measuring content in Google is to simply search for mentions of country names. Given the different names used for countries in various languages (Germany vs Deutschland vs Alemania) we conducted searches of each country's name in each of up to 23 languages 11 collected using the Google Custom Search API. We supplemented this list of official names (such as 'United States of America') with commonly used names (such as 'United States'), and common acronyms (such as 'USA'). Figure 8 presents the results in a 'tree map,' where the area of each rectangle reflects the number of retrieved pages mentioning that country. Each country is assigned a colour corresponding to its world region. A country is given a darker shade if it has a relatively high number of web pages per internet user (and a lighter shade if it has a relatively low number of web pages per internet user).
The most interesting result from this analysis is that Google indexes a relatively large number of pages about even the smallest and most sparsely populated territories. Even the Pitcairn Islands (a group of islands in the Pacific with a population of 56 people) are mentioned in over 10 million web pages. Of course, it is important to point out that Google claims that the number of results they return is an estimate: so, in some cases, our results may be overestimating the amount of content about a place. The United States has the largest total number of mentions in Google's index, followed by Japan, China, and the United Kingdom. Excluding micro-states and small island nations, the country that has the most database entries per internet user is Chad (with over 400 per user).
While Google's indexing is not characterised by the massive geographic inequalities seen in access, participation, or other platforms, there is still a very selective representation of our planet. The strong correlation between mentions of countries and internet users compared with total population, unsurprisingly, indicates that Google is simply reflecting the broader uneven information inequalities that make up the web.
Mapping OpenStreetMap
OpenStreetMap (OSM) is the world's largest roadmap, and because it is free and open source it is used as a base map for thousands of other digital platforms and services. Therefore it is important to understand how much content OSM contains about different parts of Figure 9 is based on a download from GeoFabrik.de in December 2013 containing all 2 billion nodes (i.e. elements used to represent any point feature) in OSM at that time. The number of nodes in each cell of 0.1°grid were tallied and mapped. The node density was then calculated for square area units with side length of 10 km, and a neighbourhood radius of 25 km. The United States accounts for the largest total amount of content, hosting 21% of all nodes present in OSM, followed by France, Canada, Germany and Russia, each containing more than 100 million nodes. These five countries alone comprise 58% of all the content in OSM and the group of high-income OECD countries contains almost 80% of nodes.
The Netherlands has the highest density of content, with an average of over 1000 nodes per square kilometre, followed by Belgium with over 700 nodes per square kilometre. Germany, the Czech Republic, Switzerland and France all have about 400 nodes per square kilometre. In contrast to the high density in Europe, the southern hemisphere is far more sparsely covered. Africa and Latin America are each represented by less than 5% of the world's content in OSM. In contrast, California alone accounts for almost as much content as the whole continent of Africa, and Iceland has as much content as Egypt, despite being a tenth the size and having 1/250 the population.
The contours of the semantic web: Freebase and Geonames
The semantic web is a movement to make the web more efficient by creating common frameworks that allow data to be easily shared and reused across sites, services and places. Google, for instance, has recently employed what they term their 'Knowledge Graph' as a way of reacting to user queries. Instead of displaying a simple list of links to websites as a result of a search query, the search engine looks for implicit meaning embedded in a request (such as 'what is the capital of France') and then displays structured information about that query on the right-hand side of the search page (e.g. the word 'Paris', the population of Paris, etc.). Because Google is the primary interface to web for approximately 67.6% of Americans and over 90% of Europeans (European Commission 2013), information in their Knowledge Graph plays an important role in how hundreds of millions of people interpret the world.
Information contained in the semantic web (such as the answer that Paris is the capital of France) is derived from centralised databases that feed 'facts' into services like Google, Bing, Facebook, and many other internet services. Two of the most important back-end databases for the semantic web are Freebase and GeoNames. Freebase is a general-purpose knowledge base, containing a database of tens of millions of entities (including many geographic ones), and Geonames, is the world's largest and probably most-used gazetteer or directory of place names.
The data collected from Freebase contains over 43 million entities from which we identified 478 000 place names through an algorithmic review of Freebase's RDF triples, structures that relate database objects via statements in the form subject-verb-object. The survey collected all entities associated with latitude-longitude coordinates; that is, subjects of triples associated with the verb 'has latitude' and 'has longitude'. Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of these place names and illustrates that Freebase entities are overwhelmingly concentrated in North America and Europe.
The United States has the largest concentration in Freebase -45% of placenames -even though it contains less than 5% of the world's population, and 10% of the world's internet users. As a result, the average of Freebase in the US -one place name for every 1500 people -vastly outstrips the rest of the world. For example, there are even more place names for Massachusetts in Freebase than all of India which only has one place name for every 137 000 inhabitants. A third of all Freebase place names are in Europe, with the United Kingdom possessing 7% of place names, Poland with 6%, and France with just over 5%. Most of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean are similarly underrepresented. Nigeria, for instance, contains less than 0.1% of place names in the dataset, despite being home to 2.5% of the world's population. The second backend database we explored was Geonames -a combination of freely available national gazetteers and datasets
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, as well as volunteered geographic information -constructed so that anybody, in theory, with an internet connection is able to enter or edit data. We obtained data from the gazetteer's 'data dump' 14 and
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the density of placenames listed in the gazetteer. In this map, darker colours indicate higher numbers of placenames per square kilometre. As with Freebase, the geography of Geonames is not a simple reflection of the distribution of population, although it is less skewed, with the United States accounting for 25% (rather than 45%) of the entire database. Although this is less concentrated, there is still more content about the United States than all of Asia, which contains only 23% of placenames or Europe with 19% of placenames. India is by far the most underrepresented country in the world, with only 0.6% of the collection ( Figure 12 shows the relationship between population and geographic content in more detail). Intriguingly, the standard patterns of concentrations in the global North and absences in the global South are also accompanied by some less expected patterns. Nepal, for instance, has more content than all but 10 other countries and contains more placenames than India and the United Kingdom together. We suspect this is tied to the significant efforts of a 2001 project funded by the European Union (Budhathoki and Chhatkuli 2004) to create a geographical information infrastructure in Nepal. Also noteworthy is that Iran is augmented by almost as many placenames as Germany, and that North Korea and Sri Lanka are referenced in almost as much detail as Austria. It is likely that some of these patterns appear because many of the placenames for locations outside of North America and Europe are sourced from the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and therefore reflect the interests of the US intelligence services. We also note that there are indications that a significant amount of content has been created by 'crisis mappers' (Zook et al. 2010) ; Haiti, for instance, is annotated by more content than Denmark: likely a result of work done following the 2010 earthquake in the country (for more details about the efforts of crisis mappers in Haiti, see Meier 2015) .
Because Freebase and GeoNames are now essential components of many contemporary semantic web services (for instance, the geocoding of social media), the presences and absences outlined here have the potential to have a significant impact on how we understand, interact with, and use other digital information. Freebase and Geonames may seem like small corners of the web, but the imbalances noted here can have large reverberations throughout broader information ecosystems.
As demonstrated in the section about participation, this section has demonstrated that there are broad patterns of unevenness throughout different platforms that facilitate the representation of places (see Figure 13) . Although each platform is characterised by its own idiosyncrasies, some parts of the world are massively over-represented (North America and Europe) and the rest of the world is severely under-represented. 
Conclusions: towards a study of information geographies
This paper offers a review of key geographies of access, participation and representation using a combination of existing statistics and bespoke data not previously mapped or analysed. Through this effort, the paper demonstrates that in addition to uneven geographies of access to contemporary modes of communication, uneven geographies of participation and representation are also evident and are in some cases being amplified rather than alleviated.
In short, there are few signs that global informational peripheries are achieving comparable levels of participation or representation with traditional information cores, despite the hopes of policy makers. Other slices of information geographies such as book publishing or academic journal article production, for instance, reveal similar broad-scale patterns: with the global North producing, and being the subject of, exponentially more content than the global South (cf. Dicken 2010; Graham et al. 2011) . Even the fast-paced spread of the internet to 3 billion people worldwide has done little to change this basic pattern.
Despite this rather gloomy summation, we see this work as a beginning rather than an end as well as part of an effort to confront these stubborn realities. This paper offers an initial broad-scale survey of the contemporary geographies of the production and representation of information. Future work needs to better understand the contextual causes of these uneven geographies (using inferential statistics and in-depth qualitative research) and attempt to better explicate some of the contextual nuances (why certain types of information on certain platforms are more or less likely to be produced in certain places) of these uneven geographies. Moreover, we need to focus more attention on the impacts of post-colonial modes of informational governance, the culturally contingent ways through which participation and representation take place, shifts in the political economy of control of geographic information (Leszczynski 2012) , the affordances of platforms and infrastructures of connectivity, the constraints of explicit and implicit censorship, gendered or classed constraints to access or production, and the availability or absence of a broader information ecosystem of geographic content. This paper is but a first step but important step: showing that global uneven geographies of information are not simply an outcome of the idiosyncrasies in particular platforms.
As information is ever more infused into urban environments through (im)mutable augmentations that layer everyday places, the question of what and where is represented and who is able to participate in the creation of those representations becomes absolutely fundamental. But at this moment in which geographic information is augmenting our urban environments, it is not just our cities that are being transformed, but also information itself. In order for Google, Wikipedia, OSM and many other types of geographic information to be able to augment cities, geographic content needs to be unfixed from its containers (e.g. books or universities) and then simultaneously fixed or tethered to specific locations, accessible to those in situ armed with the right technological affordances: a seeming paradox that both unfixes and fixes geographic information. This process mostly plays out behind the scenes through linked data, appropriate file formats and databases, and a broader move towards a more semantic web. Information about places is thus no longer simply mutable and ephemeral, nor is it immutable but fixed within its containers. Instead it is (im)mutable to varying degrees and tethered to locations via digital augmentations.
The result of these changes is a world in which it is increasingly difficult to ask and answer questions about information geographies and the political economy of geographic information. Changing who gets to speak from, and about, any particular place is now more complex than seizing control of a radio or TV station, the classic move of a revolutionary movement or coup.
This paper has aimed to be a beginning: offering a deliberately broad survey of a range of key platforms that mediate, host and deliver different types of geographic information. In doing so, we show one important facet of contemporary information geographies: that geographic information itself is characterised by a host of uneven geographies. We have demonstrated some of the possibilities of digital data; demonstrated that we can be mapping geographies of access, production and use (as well as the relationships between those practices); and demonstrated that we can focus on content at both the front-and back-ends of informational value chains.
Thus, efforts to understand the information geographies and the geographies of information must therefore be redoubled. This will need to involve examining not just the platforms that face end-users (such as Google), but also the back-end geographic databases (such as Freebase or Geonames) that play important ontological roles in contemporary information ecosystems. It will entail deconstructing, disentangling the mutability and immutability of information, mapping, and interrogating the geographies of information and asking critical questions about power over what is made visible and invisible within information geographies: What is shown? Where is it shown? To whom is it shows? And how do we ultimately bring about more inclusive, less uneven, and more just information geographies? European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP/2007-2013 ) / ERC Grant Agreement n. 335716. The authors are also grateful for the help of numerous colleagues who collaborated on a multiyear effort to map and measure the geographies of Wikipedia. In particular, we would like to thank Bernie Hogan, Ralph Straumann, and Ahmed Medhat.
Notes
1 This is not an attempt to make an argument that augmented geographies are 'already existing.' We instead follow Kitchin and Dodge (2007 2011) to view information geographies as ontogenetic (i.e. in a state of becoming that emerges through practices). 2 These patterns have even been described as 'a new phase in a long history of the West's attempt to colonise not only the territory and the body but also the mind of the Third World "other"' (Sardar 1995). 3 At the time of writing, 2011 data were the most complete dataset available. 4 ITU (2013) defines the indicator as the following: 'Fixed (wired)-broadband monthly subscription charge refers to the monthly subscription charge for fixed (wired)-broadband Internet service. Fixed (wired) broadband is considered to be any dedicated connection to the Internet at downstream speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kbit/s. If several offers are available, preference should be given to the 256 kbit/s connection.' We used the figures for the cheapest entry-level monthly subscription and multiplied by 12 to obtain the yearly cost. We also chose to use broadband instead of mobile broadband statistics because of current inconsistencies in collecting those data. However, mobile broadband affordability is something that future research should focus on. 5 This is done using the World Bank's ' Atlas Method' which reduces the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the data (https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/ articles/378832-what-is-the-world-bank-atlas-method). 6 This IP address resolves to a Wikimedia Foundation holding page. 7 In making this assumption, we have also taken care to remove all ccTLDs that function as de facto gTLDs from the map. This has meant removing the following ccTLDs: .tv (Tuvalu): used by the media industry; .fm (Federated States of Micronesia): used by the media industry; .am (Armenia): used by the media industry; .mu (Mauritius): used by music websites; .ac (Ascension Island): used by education-related websites; .re (Réunion): used by realestate agents; .ws (Samoa): used as an abbreviation for 'web site'; .me (Montenegro): used for personal websites; . cc (Cocos Islands): used as an alternative to .com (administered by VeriSign); .cm (Cameroon): used as an alternative to .com (as a way of exploiting typing errors); .nu (Niue): means 'now' in Danish, Dutch, and Swedish; .as (American Samoa): the suffixes ' AS' and ' A/S' are used in some countries (e.g. Norway, Denmark, and the Czech Republic) for joint stock companies; .io (British Indian Ocean Territory): used by start-up companies; .st (São Tomé and Príncipe): is used around the world in several ways; .tk (Tokelau): the .tk domain can (unusually) be registered for no monetary cost. This has meant that there are over 17 million domains registered to the country (which is more than the total registered in the United Kingdom). Despite these exclusions, we would maintain that this method offers the most comprehensive overview of the geography of top-level domains. 8 This paper aims at a global-scale survey of the geographies of information: deliberately selecting platforms and databases that are the de facto standards or most used services in most parts of the world. China, however, is the exception to most of these rules. Unlike almost everywhere else on the planet, Chinese internet users tend to use nationally bespoke tools and services (Bolsover et al. 2014) . Most of the claims we make about global-scale or regional-scale patterns therefore need to be interpreted within this limitation. 9 These data were obtained from http://stats.wikimedia.org/ wikimedia/squids/SquidReportsCountriesLanguagesVisits Edits.htm See for more details on geolocation methods that can be employed to determine the origin of edits. 10 A 'knowledge base' is a technology by computer systems used to store structured and unstructured information. Knowledge bases are crucial for the functioning of the 'semantic web' (a point expanded on later in the paper). 11 We only included languages with more than 50 million native speakers because of data limits imposed by Google. Increasing the number of languages would have substantially increased the collection time. It is important to note that some of this analysis reinforces existing biases in geographic information as we were unable to locate some country names in all 23 languages. For instance, we were able to identify Kosovo's name in only 13 languages, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, Curaçao, South Sudan, and Sint Maarten in seven languages, and Zimbabwe only in four. Most countries were however identified in over 20 languages (with many 'translations' being identical to the English-language name). The total number of queries conducted was 6046. 12 For more detailed research on the quality of OSM's coverage in different parts of the world, see Haklay (2010) . Haklay compared OSM data to high-quality data from government agencies (which makes it difficult to focus on parts of the world where high-quality official data are lacking). 13 geonames.org/data-sources.html 14 download.geonames.org/export/dump/
